The
Oligarchs and Clans in Russia accumulated state wealth during the move from a
planned to a market economy. State assets were privatized, and so they were in
the hands of a few business clans. Most
of the significant instances of corruption in Russia happened during this
period and is described as "Catastroika"[i] – as a major economic
collapse causing widespread inequality, unemployment and organized crime. Reconstruction of the state meant a weakening
authority and institutional capacity, which furthered corruption and violence.
The
problem was identified to have Soviet roots, emerging from the powerful state
machine with an authoritative and corrupt bureaucracy, which was answerable to
no one. (Johnston, 2005) Some of the most prominent cases which came to light
include the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the richest ‘‘oligarch’’ in 2003, who
amassed considerable wealth through control of Siberian oil fields while
privatizing state assets. Similarly, Oleg Deripaska was part of the takeover of
the aluminum industry and Boris Berezovsky maintained Aeroflot airlines and a
television network. Selective anti-oligarch measures happened till 2004 but
corruption was so rampant that its evidence became a saleable commodity. “Kompromat”,
or ‘compromising materials’ is widely used as an effective threat to extract
rents for covering up the case of corruption. (Johnston, 2005)
Following
the Greek tradition, which characterizes the ideal state of affairs as opposed
to the decay and decomposition that is signified by corruption, we cannot evade
the moralizing and normative tone underlying the word.[ii] MacIntyre puts forward
that politics should be a pursuit of certain “goods of excellence” – agreement
on values, say, “non-corrupt” which forms the basis of the social contract, which
would lead “goods of effectiveness” - the benefits achieved by the society as a
whole as a result of practicing the virtues, say, reduced inequality. (Knight,
1998)
In some sense, there is an indication towards the general state of lawlessness and insecurity, the inefficiency of the legal and state apparatus and also a decay of an “older normative framework” such as interpersonal relationships and trust, in the midst of rapidly expanding economic potentials in Russia. (Johnston, 2005) This could point to a shift in the understanding of the “goods” and “excellence” in the Aristotelian sense, since the political, social and economic life places certain constraints on (and in the Marxian understanding, determines) the virtues, “goods”, ideas and ethics held by a society, which in turn influences these spheres.
In some sense, there is an indication towards the general state of lawlessness and insecurity, the inefficiency of the legal and state apparatus and also a decay of an “older normative framework” such as interpersonal relationships and trust, in the midst of rapidly expanding economic potentials in Russia. (Johnston, 2005) This could point to a shift in the understanding of the “goods” and “excellence” in the Aristotelian sense, since the political, social and economic life places certain constraints on (and in the Marxian understanding, determines) the virtues, “goods”, ideas and ethics held by a society, which in turn influences these spheres.
Citations:
·
Johnston,
Michael. Syndromes of
corruption: wealth, power, and democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
·
Knight,
Kelvin. The MacIntyre Reader. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1998.
[i] See Milne, Seumas,
“Catastroika has not only been a disaster for Russia” in The Guardian, 16,
August, 2001.
[ii] See Mulgan, Richard “Aristotle on Legality and Corruption” in
“Corruption: Expanding the Focus”, ed. Manuhuia
Barcham, Barry Hindess, Peter Larmour.
Published by ANU E Press, 2012.
http://press.anu.edu.au/apps/bookworm/view/Corruption%3A+Expanding+the+focus/9901/ch02.html#toc_marke
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