This
essay attempts to revisit my previous essay on the political climate in China
in terms of calls for reform and advocacy – with new insights taking into
account the Panama papers and attempting to frame a more nuanced understanding
of corruption in China.
The
first aspect that is of note is the need to understand the political context of
anti-corruption reform. Within China, discussion and mobilization is severely
monitored. While there is sufficient room for critique and conversation on
local official and policy, the same does not extend to the highest echelons of
the government and the Politburo. All discussion is managed through both the
online censorship policy, often called ‘The Great Firewall’ as well as modes of
self censorship. Thus the way discussion on contentious topics takes place has
to be strategic – and one such strategy is to align movement goals with
professed political goals. Moreover, even in the cases where they align, if
mobilization seems to be on the rise the government may choose to curb this
conversation nevertheless. These political implications of the regime are
important context to thus understand how anti corruption reform must work –
especially in the context of these three cases. The case of the Weiquan
Movement in China looks at how members of the movement navigated the official
missives and promises in order to push forward their own agendas. However each
successful incident was met with an equal measure move by the government to
temper the activists’ power. In the case of the New Citizens’ Movement, this
chilling effect reached new levels as all the leaders were thrown behind bars.
However Xi Jinping’s main agenda continues to be that of ‘Anti Corruption’
reform and any moves against the weiquan or the NCM activists must be read
alongside this rhetoric in order for us to better understand the political
climate in terms of corruption.
The
next aspect of note is administrative ‘commitment’ to weeding out corruption. Xi’s
own agendas do not exempt the upper echelons from his gaze. The trial and
prosecution of Bo Xilai, a prominent Party member was one of the most public
instances of punishment of a high ranking official on charges of bribery and
abuse of power. Xi’s anti-graft campaign has convicted 249 officials between just
May and July of 2015 - The media has begun to call this the ‘rule of fear’. However
this gets complicated in the wake of graft-based revelations brought out by the
Panama Papers – shining light upon over 8 members of political families in
China who have overseas hidden assets and shell companies. Prominent among
these are Mao Zedong’s grandson-in-law, Li Peng’s only daughter – and Bo
Xilai’s brother-in-law. Xi himself has in the meanwhile attempted to tighten
the business ties of official families in the wake of this and expanding the
regions that such rules apply to.
How
would anti-corruption reform work given the levels of decentralization China
works within – must it be principal? Can there be some centralized aspects of
it? Must the decision finally lie in the hands of the Party President and will
the central authority and allies then face no threat of corruption charges?
Literature discussing the possibility of having an Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) on the Mainland along the Hong Kong model. The
experience of New South Wales has taught us that an empowered ICAC leaves no
stone unturned – even in the case of the Top Dogs. But the only way that might
work in China is if there were steps taken to first address concentration of
power.
References:
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1428702/mainland-china-not-ready-its-own-icac-analysts-say
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