(Assignment 2) Symptoms and treatments of Corruption - Charlotte

1.      Peru – Two decades of differing syndromes

The case of Peru is interesting for the stark contrast in the symptom and kind of corruption before and after the “Fujishock” and the release of Vladi-videos which exposed the grand corruption at the hands of Alberto Fujimori. In short, the author points out that, while the former era was symptomatic of the “Oligarchs and Clans” classification, the decentralized Toledo government which took over has more characteristics of petty corruption, with pilfering and leakage at the bottommost levels of the state machinery.
The author goes on to raise a larger question of whether certain forms of governance structures – the decentralized and autonomous wings of the government like the municipality in the case of Peru, are inherently subject to greater vulnerability to corruption. Another way to look at the issue is to explore nature and values of the state, regime change and the anti-corruption vehicles which are
“institutionalized”. As Mungiu suggests (2006), regime changes and anti-corruption reforms fail if they try to adopt anti-corrupt institutions without reforming the ideals formed by the patrimonial set-up of the society. Institutionalizing anti-corruption vehicles alone, then, might not help. 

2.    Cases from Philippines

 The case of Philippines shows a rather grim picture of massive scandals from time to time, with elites utilizing their power and networks in the pursuit of personal interests – which is yet another example of the “Oligarch and Clan” syndrome as per Johnston’s (2005) characterization.  The author then explains why the standard definition of corruption as “use of public office for private gain” does not hold water or so does the prism of legality, since most of the cases in Philippines fall within the purview of the legal. The boundaries between personal-public and legal-illegal then become blurred.

Analyzing the Philippine society more would show us that the state would be an example of “competitive particularism” (Mungiu, 2006), which is the intermediate state between inherently patrimonialistic and universalistic states. Since the social and political life impacts the values and ideals of a country, the first question then to ask would be if corruption is the exception, or is it the norm.

3.  Cases from Germany

The kind of corruption prevalent in Germany is the  "influence market" syndrome (Johnston, 2005). Officials at the highest positions and rank of state power market their influence, especially in the arena of policy making.   
While pursuing for certain "goods of effectiveness", certain "goods of excellence" are compromised by those in power.  (Knight, 1998)

According to the study of Mungiu, Germany follows the pattern of "universalistic" states. (Mungiu, 2006) He characterizes the corruption in these states as not inherently political but rather as some exception to the ideals of the society. This is brought out in the review which points out that the stability of the polity is ensured by the apparent punitive action that is taken on these corrupt politicians.

Citations:

Mungiu, Alina. "Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment." Journal of democracy 17, no. 3 (2006): 86-99.

Johnston, Michael. “Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy”, Cambridge University Press, 2005

Knight, Kelvin. The MacIntyre Reader. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998.