Corruption
was rampant and explicit during Suharto’s new regime. Michael Johnston in his
‘Syndromes of Corruption’ classifies Indonesia under the ‘official moguls’
because of weak institutions, patronage system and the lack of opposition
politics.
But at the
same time the Indonesian economy was showing impressive growth rates (GREENLEES, 2008) , implying
that the corruption did not largely affect the economic growth, as the standard
argument goes. Further, though the argument does not hold good at all cases, at
some level corruption did enhance the growth prospects in terms of lax labour
laws and regulations.
Though
corruption, at least did not enhance, did not negatively affect the economic
prospects. With this evidence, many scholars and political actors started to
celebrate Suharto’s new regime. But a deeper look at the issue portrays a different
story.
The concept
of ‘mediated corruption’ (Thompson, 1993) , is useful in
explaining the nuances in the effects of corruption. Sometimes the political
gains, motives and the benefits provide us ambiguous categorisation of whether
it is legitimate or not. But according
to mediated corruption, ignoring the legitimacy question, the idea is to look
at the effects on the democratic process. Clearly the incidents during
Suharto’s regime shows high level of perception of corruption among the
citizens, which results in lack of trust in the governance and the related
institutions. Hence affecting the participation of citizens in the democratic
process.
There is a
marked shift in the patterns of corruption after decentralization. Currently
though the anti-corruption agenda has become the locus of public debate and
decision making among the citizens and their representatives, the corrupt
businessmen still are able to influence the ministers. Cases of nepotism and threat
to officials who are refuse to indulge in corrupt practices are prevalent in
the political system of patronage (The economist , 2015) . The
officials are forced to serve the interests of the corrupt businessmen because of
the already established client-patron relationship, which still holds well in
many cases.
There are
certain measures that Indonesia can take to better its position with respect to
corruption perception index. The civil service reform has to be initiated, the
objectives of the reform should be to determine ‘optimal sizing’, right
payment, establish code of conduct for the official, to create a result
oriented public officials and empowering citizens. Secondly, the law
enforcement agencies should be clarified its roles and functions, basic
standards for integrity and professional competence, basic standards for
recruitment and training. Thirdly, the judiciary to be self-regulated and
should be monitored by an independent organisation without compromising the
independency of the judiciary. Further establish codes of conduct and ensure
transparency in nomination and appointment of judges. Finally, strengthen the
whistle blowers’ legislations and hence ensure protection to the whistle
blowers.
References
GREENLEES, D. (2008, Jan 28). Suharto's
legacy of development and corruption. Retrieved April 29, 2016, from
http://www.nytimes.com/:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28iht-suharto.1.9542684.html?_r=1
Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption,
2005
The economist . (2015, June 6). A
damnable scourge. Retrieved from
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21653671-jokowis-arduous-task-cleaning-up-government-damnable-scourge
Thompson, D. F. (1993). Mediated
Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five. The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 87, No. 2, 369-381. Retrieved April 24, 2016, from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2939047
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