The author suggests that anti-corruption
measures fail if the diagnosis of corruption is not done right, thus making a
case against the blind reproduction of anti-corruption instruments in
post-communist and post-colonial states. One should identify the typology of
corruption – if it is a norm or an exception (p. 91), whether it is an
“individual case of infringement” (pp.86) or a “social organization” (pp.87),
“what is being corrupted” and “what are the main spoils of corruption” (pp.93)
before treating it. Then, we need to organize the losers in the system,
institute the norms of universalism, and create incentives to go clean, and
then “institute” anti-corrupt mechanisms, instead of only relying on government
mechanisms which are the very own vehicles of corruption in these states.
1. “The
argument I advance is that many anticorruption initiatives fail because they
are nonpolitical in nature, while most of the corruption in developing and post-communist
countries is inherently political.” (pp.86)
2. “This
(universal) definition of corruption rests on the presumption that the state
operates under some norm of universalism and that public integrity is
understood as equal treatment of citizens.” (pp.87) but particularism.
3. “Their
treatment (of people in a patrimonial state, as opposed to a liberal state) depends
on their status or position in society, and people do not even expect to be
treated fairly by the state; what they expect is similar treatment to everybody
with the same status.” (pp.88)
4. Bribery
and corruption, then “occurs as a means of circumventing inequality; for the
many people with lower status, bribing an official may be the only way to
secure equal treatment.” (pp.88)
5. “Societies
in the real world do not all neatly divide into the categories of particularism
and universalism, but can be placed on an imaginary continuum between these two
poles.” (p.88) “Within the intermediate
category of regimes described above, which I call “competitive particularism”,
corruption explodes.” (pp.89)
6. “The
differences among these (competitive particularistic) regimes” “are outweighed
by their main similarity—the combination of pre-modern and modern corruption,
or rather of old particularism and new corruption. It is this original vicious
distribution of influence, not democratization that is to blame for the
corruption.” (pp.90)
7. “The
overall message of the anticorruption industry is that corrupt countries should
replicate the institutions of clean countries. Many countries, however, have
adopted various Western institutions without affecting the core elements of
particularism. Particularism cannot be fought by government—that is a
contradiction in terms.”(pp.96)
Primary
Reference:
Mungiu, Alina. "Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment." Journal of democracy17.3 (2006): 86-99.
Mungiu, Alina. "Corruption: Diagnosis and treatment." Journal of democracy17.3 (2006): 86-99.
Figure
1 On how to diagnose
Corruption, Mungiu (pp.94)
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