In my blog post, dated 1st
March, 2016, I had highlighted three aspects of corruption in Italy:
·
The North and South do not have
similar kinds or degrees of corruption
·
Familism in Italy is a cause
for corruption
·
Nepotism and Clientism is the
natural order of Italian life
As evident from the above features, they
are all quite confusing and maybe, even contradictory. The Geography hypothesis
and the Cultural hypothesis (Monte, Papagni: 2007; Banfield: 1955; Fukuyama:
2012) were used as my framework for my initial theorizations about the concept
of Italian Corruption.
My current review of the same, after two
months, while still generating a general level of confusion has also revealed
the complexity and interplaying of several more variables that determine and
drive corruption.
Banfield’s Amoral Familism clearly
articulates familism as the primary reason for the corrupt South Italian
countryside. Whereas, Fukuyama, justified the existence of nepotism as being an
inherent part of the Italian System. My stance, with regard to the issue, leans
more towards the former but without considering it as the only variable.
Familism, “is a highly complex construct
that can be defined and interpreted in many different ways, including in terms
of its practices, values, attitudes and norms” (Faina et al: 2010). According
to the World Values Survey (1990), familism is determined by support for
parents, number of children per woman, and divorce rates. More recently, in the
context of Italy, studies (Faina et al: 2010) show that Italians give more
importance to ‘support obligation’ than ‘traditional norms’, the two main
dimensions of Familism, while Indians preferred ‘Traditional norms’. Thus there
is a shift in the definition of familism from a more family oriented one
towards a more social network based one. In other words, we see a move away
from nepotism towards ethnic-clientism.
In this sense, the grouping of Italy within
the syndrome of Elite Cartels (Johnston: 2005) with its “political culture in
which the law and state have ambiguous status, boundaries between public and
private – and thus, between what can and cannot be bought and sold – are
indistinct, and in which private loyalties and secret societies play major
roles” seems more apropos than Oligarhs and Clans.
And as such, ignoring this issue because it
is part of the ‘Italian way of life’ or the Italian Gemeinschaft or is not
‘corruption proper’, is a highly erroneous way of perception and would hardly
result in any change because, while this system has credibility and reciprocity,
it perpetuates inequality and is a systemic problem that can be changed and
should be changed through socio-politico policies by strong independent and neutral
institutions.
REFERNCES
Faina et al. The Two Faces of Familism: A
Cross-Cultural Research in India and Italy (2010) Published by Springer.
Fukuyama, Francis: The Two Europes. (2012)
Published in the American Interest. http://www.the-american-interest.com/2012/05/08/the-two-europes/
Harrison. Huntingtion: Culture Matters: How
Values Shape Human Progress (2000) Published by Basic Books.
Johnston, Micheal: Syndromes of Corruption
(2005) Published by The Cambridge University Press.
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