(Assignment 1) Indonesia: A Social Perspective of Corruption - Angitha SM

Francis Fukuyama’s concept of social capital and trust makes it easier in analysing the corruption in Indonesia through a social perspective. According to Fukuyama “social capital is the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations.” He divides this social capital into two; ‘familistic’ associations and ‘voluntary’ associations. The first set of social capital is the trust that exists between the family members and the latter is the trust between non-kinship relations, i.e. outside the family; with strangers. People placing their trust on others, generally depends on the values and moral standards of the society they belong to. Their environment should convince them that they can afford to rely and trust others. It shows that trust mainly comes out of a sense of social solidarity, that they believe different groups in society have a shared fate, and that there is a responsibility on them to provide possibilities for those with fewer resources.

Consider these major corruption cases in Indonesia;

1.     Suharto corruption case: Suharto during his presidency established different charity organisations such as Supersemar, Dana Sejahtera Mandiri, Trikora etc. The income of all these charities came from mostly state owned banks and tax money. These organisations turned out to be channels for Suharto’s money embezzlement. In 2004, Transparency International’s corrupt politicians list was topped by Mr. Suharto, estimating that he and his family allegedly embezzled $15 to $35 billion during his 32-year long presidency.

2.     Hambalang Corruption Case: Choel Mallarangeng, Fox News Consultant and Andi Mallarangeng, former Indonesian Sports Minister, were proclaimed suspects in a multi-million dollar corruption case. Both accused are brothers of the Indonesian socialite, Rizal Mallarangeng. Mallarangeng was found guilty of accepting bribes (IDR 4 billion and USD $550,000) from contractor Global Daya Manunggal. Mallarangeng was bribed in order to manipulate the procurement and budgeting process of the Hambalang sports complex (constructed in the context of the 2011 SEA Games). Part of the money that Mallarangeng received was used to fund his campaign in the Democratic Party chair election.

In the cases above we can observe that there lacks the second social capital Fukuyama talks about; ‘voluntary associations’. This lack of trust or we can say there is only particularised trust, i.e. loyalty is only inside the group or family. They do not give significance to the sense of shared fate. It is not the generalised trust which is extended to the whole of the society or other groups. In all three cases family/close relatives are engaged in the corruption. That is, the shared fate and the sense of sharing the fewer resources is only among the kin- relations. In Indonesia, we can say, corruption is based upon loyalty to the in-group and not to the larger society. This may be due to the fact that Indonesia is a democratic state with a feudalistic political culture.

References

1.     Rothstein, Bo and Uslaner, Eric M. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust” World Politics, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Oct., 2005), pp. 41-72 

2.     Grey, Kenneth R, Book Review “Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity by Francis Fukuyama. International Journal on World Peace Vol. 14, No. 1 (MARCH 1997), pp. 84-87

3.     http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/28/world/asia/28iht-suharto.1.9542684.html?_r=0

http://www.globalindonesianvoices.com/10165/high-profile-corruption-cases-in-indonesia/

(Assignment 1) Piled Higher and Deeper: An analysis of Denmark - Anand Sreekumar

Denmark as a choice would seem strange if not ironic, when one considers the prevalence of corruption. Denmark has consistently been at the helm of the corruption perception index, published by Transparency International. Yet the stark fact that even Denmark merits consideration when discussing corruption shows how complicated the landscape of corruption is and reaffirms the importance of a philosophical perspective.

The incidence of corruption is mostly two-fold. Transparency in funding for political parties is identified as the greatest potential problem.  The perception index masks the larger picture as the perception of corruption is favourable only towards the public sector while political parties were viewed in a far negative light. The Danish law also has significant loopholes. Politicians don’t have to publish donations, if they are private. Even if private donations above 20000 Kr are required by law to be published, this can be evaded by spreading the donations across different local branches of a political party. The transparency of the laws in Denmark is much weaker when compared to its Nordic counterparts.

The second issue is that of foreign bribery. According to a report published by the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 2013, though the no of allegations were less (13), the implementation rate is deplorable as the necessary actions have only been implemented in case of one.

From a theoretical perspective with regards to syndromes to corruption, this scenario is a clear illustration of the principle of influence markets when private interests influence the political parties through wealth. The key is in the details, the minor loopholes in the law which make the difference. In summation, the system doesn’t just withstand this, but Denmark universally enjoys universal recognition as the least corrupt state in the world.

From a philosophical perspective, the ideas of Aristotle are still valid surprisingly. His emphasis on subjectivity, ie a necessary consideration of the circumstances before arriving at a universal conception cannot be more apt while situating Denmark. Problems with use of public office, significantly on the opposite end of the ethical spectrum still persist in the ‘least corrupt’ nation, adapting itself to the neo liberal scenario, assuming quite subtle forms. Questions arise with respect to the limits of corruption, or whether such a conception is needed at all. Courtesy foreign bribery, these limits concern the spatial aspect as well in the backdrop of globalisation transgressing national boundaries. The Swiss banking system is a notable example in this respect.  Given the increasingly complicated scenario, the only consensus which ought to be arrived, in my opinion, is not a case for multiple perceptions of corruption alone but the malleability of the very notion of corruption in the ever changing socio-political scenario as well.  

Sources

1.     http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20120112_denmark_study

2.     http://www.oecd.org/corruption/denmarkmustinvestigateforeignbriberymoreproactively.htm

3.     Johnson, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power and Democracy, Cambridge (2005)

(Assignment 1) Corruption in Colombia - Amrithavarshini V

Colombia is a country where corruption is pervasive and far reaching in all levels of government. Colombia ranks eighty third in the corruptions perceptions index. A combination of factors are the cause for the high levels of political corruption in Colombia, of which drug trafficking, guerrilla and paramilitary conflict, and weak institutions are important aspects. Additionally, there are severe threats against whistle blowers, and a weak civil society that is dispassionate and often is involved in, or turns a blind eye towards, corruption. Actors in the Colombian government often work like an elite cartel, acting at will and colluding with private players and the police. They themselves have a hand in many drug trafficking scandals, and investigations often do not lead to their punishment. They are also granted immunity within their parties. In the public eye, corruption is not seen as a huge enough threat owing to the fact that they are more concerned with immediate manifestations of violence. Additionally, the disillusioned public treat corruption such that it is almost a norm. 

Three scandals:-

1.     Colombian Parapolitics Scandal

The term parapolitics describes the ties between the currently formally demobilized paramilitary organization – AUC, Colombian lawmakers, and public officials. It was found in 2006 after seized computers were broken into that the politicians had signed pacts with the paramilitary to ‘refound’ the motherland. Since them, multiple governers have been arrested for using paramilitary intimidation to get into elected office. There are numerous pending investigations. Chief among the many politicians convicted was Mario Escobar, the cousin of President Uribe, and the former President of Congress.

2.     Yidispolitics Scandal

In April 2008, ex-politician Yidis Medina admitted to taking bribes to vote in favour of the re-election project, which changed the constitution, allowing Alvaro Uribe Velez to become a president for a second term. The Supreme Court found her guilty, and asked that the Constitutional Court of Colombia review the reform that allowed him stand for the second consecutive presidential scandal. The president held a national referendum to legitimate his election, and then went on to accuse the magistrates of corruption. The judges of the supreme court were then sued.

3.     Sale of Arms to Paramilitary by the Army

In December 2015, eight army officials (current and retired) who were involved in selling arms to paramilitaries and trafficking drugs were arrested by the Colombian police. They were accused of stealing weapons, ammunition, and explosives from army barracks and selling them to groups that were revealed to have connections with the AUC. Despite the AUC’s disbanding, successor groups continue to exist and be supported by officials from within. The arrests were part of a larger investigation into corrupt officials and trafficking circles which began in 2012. In March 2014, 14 members of the military, active and retired, were arrested.

(Assignment 1) NEPOTISMO, CLIENTISOMO AND CORRUPTION IN ITALY - Akshyah Kumar

The story of Italy in the context of corruption is complicated for many reasons:-

●      The north and south do not operate in tandem: Having been subjected to different modes of governance historically (In the paper, The Determinants of Corruption in Italy: Regional Panel Data Analysis, Monte and Papagni trace several more reasons for this divide) – the north with its strong independent city-states like Venice, Milan, etc., and the south almost always with a far-away, absent central authority – ‘corruption’ was/is more rampant in the South than the North

●      Edward C. Banfield’s Amoral Familism in South Italy: In 1955, during his visit to a poor south Italian town, Banfield noticed a peculiar Italian phenomenon, which he terms, Amoral Familism. In the Moral Basis of A Backward Community, he justifies his term as such: Such backwardness is explained ‘largely but not entirely by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family’

●      Nepotismo and Clientelismo: Both these terminologies have their origins in the Italian culture of Papacy: nepos as ‘nephew’ or ‘grandson’ and client as ‘patronage’ or ‘follower’. The patron-son relationship is the basis of Italian tradition and is considered by many scholars as the sustaining bedrock of Italian society as opposed to Italian corruption. To quote Francis Fukuyama in The Two Europes, “Clientelism should be distinguished from corruption proper because of the relationship of reciprocity that exists between politicians and voters. There is a real degree of accountability in a clientelistic system: the politician has to give something back to supporters if he or she is to stay in power, even if that is a purely private benefit.”

This ambiguity regarding the ambit of the definition of corruption in Italy is best revealed when seen in the context of Parentopoli and Berlusconi.

●      Professor Luigi Frati, the Rector of La Sapienza University in Rome, had appointed his wife, daughter and son (all from very modest academic backgrounds) in positions of great academic qualifications in his University. Popularly titled as the ‘Parentopoli’ or ‘Relative-gate’ incident, it highlights the grey area of Italian corruption, invoking responses from him thusly, "In Italy we are not used to being meritocratic through strictly objective criteria. We are used to doing it our own way."

●      Similarly, despite incriminating evidences – near-complete ownership of Italian media houses; obvious economic ties with mafia families; several allegations of sexual assault and tax-fraud convictions – Silvio Berlusconi. still had/has a huge popularity in Italy having been the longest serving post-war Prime Minister. According to the Economist, his ardent disavower, “Instead they (the people) offer the excuse that the fault is not his; it is their unreformable country's.”